Abstract. This paper is about the conflict between the modern formal treatment of statistical inference and the role of subjectivity, inventiveness and personal involvement which, I claim, should be allowed in any non trivial applied probabilistic modelling. I concentrate, intentionally, on the limitations of the formal treatment and try to overemphasize the qualitative, informal judgments involved in applied inference. Overdispersion and Item Response models are used as an illustration.
Away from Formal Statistical Inference
By Formal Inference I roughly mean the cultural paradigm underlying almost all theoretical formulations about drawing statistical inferences. The usual story goes like this: we have observations about a random variable whose distribution depends on unknown parameters. I have no objection to this for the situations where the probability distribution under consideration is produced by sampling from a finite population or by random assignment of treatments to units, where modelling is indeed trivial. In most other cases, as I will try to show below, to describe the randomness within which the data may be embedded is like inventing a story which, however, has to be consistent in its own terms.
Formal Inference deals with idealized situations; as such the relevance of its results for those who work with applications may be similar to the relevance of grammar for good writing. The most common form in which the tools from mathematical statistics may be used is that, if we pretend that a set of very restrictive assumptions hold true, then we can assess how much the data support a single hypothesis of interest. This is fine as long as we do not forget that it is based on a good deal of fiction.
A brief historical digression
I wish I had the competence to trace the origins of this paradigm since the early formulations of the method of least squares until when Fisher (1935) phrased it in a way which is essentially the same that we use today. Roughly speaking, in the formulation of astronomical problems whose solutions led to the method of least squares (see for instance Stigler, 1986 , Cap. 1), there were rather well defined physical quantities which could not be observed without error and they were treated as unknowns in a system of linear equations, with each equation corresponding to an observation.
It may be of interest to notice that the problem of estimating, for a given earthquake, the coordinates of the hypocenter and the time of the event, which is a genuine statistical problem, is formulated in modern seismology (Lay and Wallace, 1995, p. 221-224) in exactly the same way. Let τ be the time of the event and t i the time of arrival of the P-wave at the ith station, λ be the coordinates of the hypocenter and y i those of the ith station. Under the assumption that the waves travel at constant speed µ, one can write down a system of equations of the form
which expresses the relation between the time of departure of the wave, the distance, the time of arrival and the speed. Here τ and λ are what we call parameters but to the seismologist they are just unknowns in a over determined system of equations. When parameters are no longer well defined physical quantities, we enter into the realm of fantasy. In itself this is not a bad thing as long as we keep in mind that, though parameters should provide the answer to relevant questions of interest in the problem at hand, often they exist only in the model which is defined through them. For a study about the origin of the word 'parameter' see the contribution of Stigler to the discussion of Leonard (1976) . My impression is that Fisher and his contemporaries while using the word parameter were aware of real applications of which they had direct personal experience. Today instead we have many theoretical statisticians who are very familiar with the formal properties of the theory but have very little contact and interest for the problems to which the theory could be applied.
Keynes or coming back to the real thing
An important part of Keynes' book A treatise on Probability, which first appeared in 1920, is devoted to a criticism of Statistical Inference. Though the discussion is based on works published before 1920 and thus Keynes does not seem to be aware of Fisher's contributions, the main points in his criticism of Statistical Inference, contained in Part V of the book, seem to me to be extremely relevant to a modern statistician. In a way, Keynes' criticism brings us back to the real issues underlying any inference, including those based on statistical methods. However, my assessment of the relevance of Keynes in this respect is probably not shared by many statisticians: see for example Stigler (1999) for additional references and a very critical evaluation.
According to Keynes, the statistician is faced with all the difficulties which are inherent to inductive reasoning: a good deal of the knowledge which must be taken into account is of a vague nature and incapable of numerical treatment (Keynes, 1948, p. 328) . What makes the life of the statistician easier is that, part of the information which is to be taken into account, is available in a convenient and manageable form, summarized into statistics. This situation, however, may be misleading if one believe that statistics is all that one needs to consider, Keynes (1949, p. 391):
No one supposes that a good induction can be arrived at merely by counting cases. The business of strengthening the argument chiefly consists in determining whether the alleged association is stable when the accompanying conditions are varied. This process of improving the Analogy, as I have called it in Part III, is, both logically and practically, at the essence of the argument.
In other words, the strength of an inductive conclusion must increase with the diversity and complexity of the experimental conditions under which, for example, a given treatment is effective. Often these issues will be discussed when planning the data collection or designing an experiment and involve a lot of qualitative assessments about which set of circumstances might affect the result or association of interest. Now, according to the formal treatment of the subject in statistics, it seems that, by simply increasing the number of observations, we can also increase the strength of an empirical finding. Suppose for instance that we want to compare two fertilizers; if all the observations are taken in the same area, in a given period and under similar conditions, we clearly have very little support for extending what has been observed, even if the number of trees used in the experiment is very large. Moreover, usually, once the data have been collected, only very simple information will be available concerning the design and the methods of observation. The problem is even more serious when, as it is customary in scientific papers, one tries to reanalyze popular data sets which are, usually, almost completely abstracted from the context in which they were produced.
A closely connected problem is that the strength of an inference must also depend on how wide and general is the statement we are willing to assert. The fact is that there is no way for expressing such features within Formal Statistical Inference. Consider again the example of a designed experiment to examine the effectiveness of different fertilizers; our conclusions might be valid for predicting the results for the same area, in the same period and possibly under very similar atmospheric conditions. But with these restrictions there is almost no inference but simply a description of what did happen in a very specific context. Though these issues are usually ignored in the statistical literature, I think that they are somehow related to the notion of overfitting. I do not know of any generally accepted definition of overfitting, but I have seen the notion used occasionally by referees to mean roughly that, if the model fits very well, it is likely that some dirty trick has been used. A more serious assessment of overfitting should look for indirect signs that the model is likely to be making statements about accidental facts specific of the observed data. To take an extreme example, in a linear model context, by inspecting a large number of possible contrasts, it should not be difficult to find a small subset of these contrasts whose estimates are highly significant and a model stating that the remaining linearly independent contrasts are 0 will probably fit very well. Thus, the essential quality of overfitting is not that the model fits well, but that it is making assertions about randomness and this should be revealed by the fact that what the model asserts looks complicated and uninteresting.
2 Where do models come from ?
The title of this section echoes a similar title in a paper by Lehmann (1990) who complained that Fisher had apparently very little to say but "As regards problems of specification, these are entirely a matter for the practical statistician". In the following I will try to discuss the issue from a very personal point of view and highlight certain connections between Statistics and the Arts.
In many instances probabilistic models may be seen as the outcome of a dialog between two parties which I will call the statistician and the scientist with the understanding that more than one person may be involved on both sides. The statistician will usually know very little about the specific field until the scientist comes along with the data or a research project. The quality of the dialog that will be established will affect the quality of the resulting work to an extent which is comparable to that due to the technical abilities of each party in their own fields. To begin with, each side will be speaking in a different language. So, it is likely that the scientist, when asked to describe the applied context, will describe how things should behave according to some preliminary model which is not acknowledged as such. The starting point of the scientific investigation or the scientist's expectations may be inconsistent or rely on assumptions which, once translated into a probabilistic framework, may turn out to be vague or meaningless.
On the other hand, the statistician will often be tempted to pay little attention to details that do not fit easily into the probabilistic framework which seemed initially appropriate. Indeed it is often the case that something which initially may seem irrelevant or simply a nuisance, at a closer look may reveal interesting features. For instance, in a study of the population dynamics of a species of crustacea, an excess of variability, initially accommodated into a model of overdispersion, led later to examine more closely the sampling process. It turned out that the scientists had provided an over simplified description of the sampling process and that what had been explained by a strange feature of the spacial distribution of the crustacea was instead due to the fact that only a small proportion of the material collected from the lake was actually examined. So, while the scientist may forget to disclose impor-tant piece of information, especially if this could bring discredit upon her/his work, the statistician is likely to be reassuringly inaccurate when asked to translate the probabilistic assumptions into the scientist own language.
The way of questioning the other party and of being alerted against the potential misunderstandings described above is something that can only be learned by watching other people doing it and is an instance of what Polanyi (1954) calls personal skills. Two other important notions which are particularly relevant here and were also developed by Polanyi are those of personal involvement and intellectual passions. Even in a simple context, if we do not take anything for granted, the actual class of possible models would be very wide and even if we were able to explore all of them, we would hardly find our way out of the Labyrinth. If some structure will eventually emerge, this will be to some extent an invention rooted in the reality as well as into our own curiosity and obsessions.
Is Statistics an Art ?
This is again a quote from Lehmann (1990) :
Is applied statistics, and particularly model building, an art with each new case having to be treated from scratch (although even artistic endeavors require technique that can be systematized and learned), completely on its own or does theory has a contribution to make to this process ?
Consider how, within our community, we decide which are the relevant fields of research and how we assess the merits of s single research project: certainly not on the basis of formal or objective criteria, rather more often we are guided by our emotional response telling us that something goes into the right direction. So this is another instance of Polanyi's intellectual passions which however may be trained and it is mainly through personal contacts that we statisticians come to share some common feelings about the style of probabilistic modelling. It is easy to see that these attitudes have much in common with the poetics of artistic movements.
The main issue here is: how much space there is for subjectivity and inventiveness in applied probabilistic modelling and how tight is the constraint that the model has to fit the data after all. If the model has to contain a generalization, it must aim to catch only those features of the data which are of interest. So, for instance, if there is no reason to suspect that the order with which cases are observed makes any difference, this information will not even be taken into account and even if we noticed an apparent systematic effect, this will probably be attributed to chance. In other cases it is the model itself that says how its adequacy should be assessed; a particularly interesting instance is that of binomial models with overdispersion: it is as if these models were born with an alibi for not fitting as expected.
Models or fantasies ? An example from Item Response Models
To make my discussion more specific I will try to apply it to item response theory. This is essentially a flexible set of probabilistic models aimed to represent the behavior of n subjects, selected at random from a given population, who submit to an examination made up of J dichotomous items (questions).
In the latent class version of these models, one imagines that the population is made up of C different latent classes of individuals which are homogeneous with respect to the abilities needed to answer the items correctly. Let x denote a J ×1 vector of possible responses, that is a string of 0's and 1's that will be called response configuration; clearly there are 2 J possible configurations and we may denote with p c the vector whose elements are the probabilities of providing all possible response configuration (ordered, say, lexicographically) conditionally on latent class c; this vector describes completely the behavior of subjects in latent class c.
Most item response models assume that the events of giving a correct answer to different items are independent, conditionally on a given latent class and that latent classes may be ordered in a unique way from the worst to the best (with respect to the probability of answering correctly any given item). A substantial simplification is achieved by the Rasch model which, in the context of finite mixtures (see Lindsay and alt., 1991) , assumes that the difference between the conditional logits for any pair of items is constant across latent classes and depends only on the differential difficulties of the items.
Over or underdispersion ?
Clearly, latent classes are just fiction and any inference will have to be based on the so-called manifest distribution, that is marginally on latent classes; the corresponding data are contained in the vector of observed frequencies y giving the number of subjects classified according to the response configuration they provide, irrespective of the latent class to which they belong. Now the question is: what is the probability distribution of y or, at least, what is its variance matrix ? Clearly, if this distribution was multinomial, we would have
where p is an appropriate vector of marginal probabilities having the same structure as p c . The matter is not so trivial as it may appear and in fact Darroch et alt., (1993) in the context of capture recapture data, devoted an Appendix to show that the distribution is almost multinomial though dispersion is less than multinomial. A simple proof of this last statement is as follows. Let y c be the frequency distribution for the n c subjects belonging to latent class c. If we let p = n c p c /n, the variance of y conditionally on n = ( n 1 . . . n C ) and P = ( p 1 . . . p C ), is simply the sum of the (conditional) multinomial variances and may be transformed by adding and subtracting npp so that
and the claim follows from the fact that the first component is a multinomial variance and the second component is a positive definite matrix.
What is not clear, however, is why we should condition to so many quantities which are unobservable and exist only in our fiction. A different model arise if we assume, for instance, that the n c (the number of subjects sampled from each latent class) are fixed but the p c are random with E(p c ) = p and V ar(p c ) = V . Computations are straightforward but a lot more tedious in this case and are omitted, however the result is well know and has been used, for instance, by Brown and Payne (1986) A somehow surprising result arise if we assume that the p c are constant while the number of subjects sampled from each latent class follow a multinomial distribution: in this case the variance of the manifest distribution is exactly multinomial. Essentially this is so because the additional dispersion induced by the sampling variation of the n c compensate exactly the underdispersion of the initial model, which was equivalent to a mixture of conditional multinomial distributions. More precisely, if we let the n c have a multinomial distribution with expectation nπ c and π denote the vector of probabilities with elements π c , then the variance of E(y) = P n may be written as nP Ω(π)P and this is equal to n π c (p c − p)(p c − p) .
All of these models, and many others, were described by Gini (1908, pp 151-154) in his study of the distribution of sexes in human births. Each model is formulated without ambiguity by specifying in detail the random procedure that can generate the data. For instance, for the second model above he assumes that we first select with replacement a given number n of balls from a box containing balls numbered from 1 to C and obtain the sample sizes n c ; then, for each c from 1 to C, select n c balls from a box having a composition based on p c . However, in Gini's applications, over or under dispersion are testable assumptions because he was considering the distribution of families with a given number of children according to the number of sons and daughters and not according to all possible configurations of sex in the children ordered by age. In other words, in Gini's context the manifest distribution may be compared against the binomial distribution. Instead, in the context of item response (or capture-recapture) data, with the single table y the issue is undecidable.
